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In numerous research programs based on the concept of cognitive 
dissonance, participants play a role that is ostensibly in conflict with their pre-
existing values.  A strict reading of dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) leads us to 
suppose that these role-playing, or “forced compliance” procedures generally create 
results that are not implied by the theory.  Two alternative interpretations of the 
forced compliance phenomena are introduced here. 
The first of these regards the procedures from the standpoint of 
internalization of multiple value repertoires.  From this viewpoint, the effects of role-
playing do not stem from contradictions—or dissonance—within the person’s sets of 
values.  The second interpretation, based in part on Festinger’s theory of efference, 
allows that the effects of role-playing derive from the guiding character of intended 
action. 
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Robert A. Wicklund and Jack W. Brehm 
 
In literally hundreds of experiments, people who have been induced to "freely" 
choose to say or do something with which they originally strongly disagreed, 
subsequently indicate they hold a more moderate position.  Dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 1957), on which most such experimental work has been based, stipulates 
that how a person resolves the disagreement between prior attitude and current 
behavior depends on the resistance to change of relevant cognitions.  Thus, when 
people say something in disagreement with a prior attitude, they should bolster one side 
of the issue and trivialize the other—that is, they should adopt a strong position either 
favoring their recent behavior or favoring their prior attitude, depending on which 
cognitions are more resistant to change.  A moderate position does neither, but a 
moderate position is what “forced compliance” experiments produce. 
Sally is a college student in the USA, has grown up in the American 
south, the daughter of an entrepreneurial family.  Her junior year in college is 
approaching, and after contemplating several possibilities for a year abroad, 
she elects to spend her time in France. Her first several weeks with her host 
family, in a small city, entail a novel living context.  She models and imitates 
the language and makes purchases in keeping with modern French styles.  
She also adopts a more traditional French pattern of eating, in that she sits 
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together with the family for meals, and does not "graze" or nibble, or eat on 
the street, as was her custom back home (Stearns, 1997). 
The father of the French household, a union leader, guides Sally toward 
opportunities to play the role of the French labor force.  Not only does she 
begin to try out the vocabulary corresponding to labor rights, but she also 
takes a part-time job and finds herself in the midst of a work force that is not 
reluctant to strike. 
Internalization of a New Perspective 
The classic and modern literature on internalization (Abelson, 1986; 
Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Charon, 1979; Deci, 1975; Kelman, 1953; King & 
Janis, 1956; Habermas, 1996; Hoffmann, 1977; Mead, 1934; Wicklund, 1989) 
can readily be brought to bear on the dynamics of Sally's value systems.  
Central in these conceptual approaches is activity, meaning that an attitude, 
value, moral, personality trait, or attachment to a material possession is 
internalized not through passive exposure, but by the person's becoming 
active with respect to the object--i.e. contents--of internalization. 
This means concretely that the behavioral disposition (attitude; value; 
moral) or material possession comes to be owned subjectively, not through 
passive exposure, but by the person's becoming active with respect to the 
new perspective or possession.  A sense of free will, volition, and lack of 
constraint underlies the acquisition of a subjective attachment to,or ownership 
of, the aspect to be internalized.  Thus relatively unconstrained role-playing, 
improvising on the basis of a culturally-set pattern, choosing or altering the 
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contours of one's possessions (Habermas, 1996), and otherwise acting in 
unconstrained ways can lead to internalization.  It follows, of course, that a 
lengthy or effort-ridden route to internalization will firm up one's sense of 
acting volitionally, and reduce any sense that the value or possession, so 
acquired, has been handed out or forced on oneself. 
In the case of Sally abroad, this would mean that her French family has 
posed numerous models for action, has not placed heavy constraints on her 
or shaped up her behavior strictly with incentives and threats.  A new value 
acquired under such circumstances is then likely to be regarded as "her own" 
(Hoffman, 1977; Wicklund, 1989), and material possessions, such as French 
clothing or books, are also more likely to be regarded as her own, thus as 
closely attached to her own person, and as attractive (Habermas, 1996). 
Under these circumstances Sally is not simply the passive recipient of 
information, learning about a culture in a trouble-free manner.  To the 
contrary: All that she undertakes in the sense of her role in labor relations, 
new culinary habits, the language, and other daily affairs is accompanied in 
the initial stages by a variety of emotional states.  These will be variously 
experienced as frustration (Amsel, 1972), conflict, surprise, embarrassment -- 
as she is in the course of trying out a multitude of unfamiliar behavioral 
perspectives.  Active improvisation and attempted role-playing are frought 
with awkwardness, starts and stops; delay of gratification is an integral 
component of acquiring complex new habits and orientations (Mischel, 1996).  
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To be sure, Hoffman (1977) even refers to "optimal levels of arousal" as 
furthering the internalization of moral values. 
The fact of difficulties, frustration, and accompanying emotions has one 
general meaning for any of the preceding perspectives on internalization: The 
more barriers to proceeding in a given new direction, no matter whether the 
barriers are based in physical, temporal, or internal (e.g. competence) 
factors, the greater should be the sense of being internally directed (de 
Charms, 1968), and the more the person should be motivationally aroused 
(Brehm & Self, 1989; Brehm, Wright, Solomon, Silka, and Greenberg, 1983; 
Wright, 1996).  Of course, it functions this way only so long as the person 
does not abandon the effort and retreat from the novel opportunities for 
internalization.  It is this sense of action stemming from a "causal agent self" 
-- the feeling of being an origin -- that is the common denominator of all of the 
above notions about internalization. 
As the weeks pass, Sally should progressively gain a subjective feeling 
of owning much of what she has freely and diligently practiced (Abelson, 
1986; Habermas, 1996; Wicklund, 1989).  More concretely, the child 
developmental and other literature on internalization points to the following 
when it speaks of a value, or some socially esteemed object, as having been 
internalized: 
1.  a sense that the contents are "mine", 
2.  the internalized condition will serve as a basis for future behavior, 
thus moral action, or protection of possessions, 
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3.  the person will project the ownership backward in time, coming to 
believe that the ownership is a long-term affair (Wicklund, 1989), 
4.  a heightened valuation of the contents of the internalization 
(Habermas, 1996).  Certainly this latter point is quite evident as a derivation 
from Heider's (1958) ideas about the relation between unit formation and 
affect.    
This means that Sally will gradually come to think of certain pro-labor 
values, as well as French eating habits, as "her own".  Second, she will come 
to execute behaviors in line with these new values without constant prodding 
from the social environment.  Third, she will regard her values and 
possessions, so acquired, as having been in her repertoire for a considerable 
length of time, even prior to her recent French experiences (Wicklund, 
Reuter, & Schiffmann, 1988).  Fourth, this internalization will be accompanied 
by her attraction to these hard-earned aspects of her new existence. 
Multi-Faceted Repertoires 
In a similar manner Sally, in her younger years, had internalized a 
variety of corresponding values, styles, linguistic habits and also attachments 
to material possessions.  Many of these, such as her family's low esteem of 
workers' rights, were brought into her personal grasp in the same way as her 
French values.  That is, role-playing, and not simply passive exposure, 
accompanied the internalization of the repertoire that she had gained in her 
local American community. 
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These new and old systems can exist side-by-side, and they do not 
necessarily have to be in psychological conflict with one another.  If we follow 
the reasoning of Baldwin and Holmes, 1987; Berger and Luckman, 1966; 
Charon, 1979;  Flanagan, 1996; Kvale, 1996; Gergen, 1991; and Wicklund, 
1999, the elements that are internalized later do not cancel out or replace 
those internalized earlier.  Rather, Sally's progressively encompassing the 
elements of pro-labor in France, as well as many other new behavioral 
dispositions, can be called expanding her internalization repertoire.  There is 
no theoretical language in the internalization literature to suggest a limit on 
the breadth of one's repertoire.  The literature implies neither a limit based on 
capacity nor one based on contradictions or illogic.  Thus the feeling or 
emotion of ownership pertains simply to ownership, to what is "internal", and 
does not automatically include an impulse or need to substitute the new for 
the previous values or morals. 
Within this context of actively internalizing behavioral perspectives and 
coming to sense ownership, there are underlying reasons for supposing that 
the new and the old can exist side-by-side: 
1.  Security.  The person whose values, skills, or other possessions are 
anchored in long experience or training might be said to be "secure", a notion 
that surfaces in a variety of psychological literature (Horney, 1950; 
Rosenberg, 1979; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982).  It follows that such 
behavior/experience-based security allows the person to explore, to try 
different routes, to engage in actions that for the observer seem to contradict 
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or disparage the originally-internalized direction.  Insecurity, in contrast, 
would set a limit on the readiness to expand one’s repertoire. 
2.  Ownership takes precedence over consistency.  Diverse sources of 
literature   point to the idea that ownership/internalization reduces or 
circumvents the person's consideration of the "fit", or perceived 
consistency/inconsistency, among the facets that have been or are being 
internalized. 
For one: Ainslie (1986) begins with a person who has adopted a 
relatively long-term project, such as weight-reduction.  But then come freely-
instigated deviations from the long-range project, as when the individual -- 
failing to tolerate the frustration -- elects to imbibe in chocolate and heavy 
fried food.  In those moments, according to Ainslie, there is no 
psychologically felt contradiction or discrepancy.  All of the projects or 
perspectives belong in the person's active set of behavioral dispositions. 
Second, a set of notions by Flanagan (1996) also begins with the active 
individual, the activity leading to what the author terms “personal identity".  
The activity, for Flanagan, does not produce an identity with a singular 
direction or unitary set of values, but rather, the product is a "multiplex self" 
(p. 67), meaning behavioral dispositions that are not coherent with one 
another for the observer. 
Also pertinent are the derivations from Meadian (1934) theory such as 
Charon's (1979) statement.  Again we have an activity/imitation-based 
internalization of values, with a highly diverse, heterogeneous result.  This 
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viewpoint does not assume a need for complete congruency among the 
values ("generalized others") that are so internalized.  Symbolic 
interactionism is also the starting point for the empirical work of Baldwin and 
Holmes (1987), a project that illustrates experimentally the heterogeneity of 
the individuals' values. 
Finally, it is interesting to examine how people treat the personality 
traits that are typically associated with their own areas of expertise.  Several 
studies by Wicklund and Braun (1990) and Wicklund and Koller (1991) show 
that respondents whose competencies are firmly anchored in experience or 
training are not intent on creating an internally-consistent personality portrait 
for that competence area.  
Taken together, these several pertinent directions imply that Sally and 
her counterparts will not be attuned to incongruities among the various, 
mutually relevant facets that have been or are being internalized.  Tolerance 
in matters of sexually explicit literature does not interfere with possessing 
Puritanical values (Baldwin & Holmes, 1987); having a Personality Trait A 
does not preclude a sense of also possessing an opposite Trait B (Sande, 
Goethals, & Radloff, 1988).  Ownership, as resulting from the person's own 
efforts, evidently suppresses or renders irrelevant the urge to create a good 
Gestalt or internal logic among the features that belong to one's own 
repertoire. 
Confrontation of the Two Values 
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In the midst of the junior year abroad Sally's father shows up for a brief 
visit.  He brings with him the salience of a number of values that Sally had 
earlier incorporated, including the notion that labor should be used 
expediently.  We may focus here on these two seemingly opposing value 
systems -- protective of labor in France vs. using labor expediently in Sally's 
birth place -- in order to illustrate the perspective of the theory of cognitive 
dissonance on the situation. 
First of all, cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) would regard 
the two values as relevant for one another in Sally's perceptions.  They are 
both approaches to labor relations, and her father's presence makes the 
juxtaposition compelling.  The two values are also ostensibly in dissonant 
relation: One implies the negation of the other.  To be sure, the process of 
Sally's role-playing and practicing pro-French values regarding labor, against 
the backdrop of her earlier persuasions, is akin to the procedures followed in 
hundreds of pieces of research oriented around dissonance theory. 
The Cognitive Dissonance Perspective on Sally's State 
A traditional cognitive dissonance analysis must regard the values, 
sentiments, and behavioral tendencies experienced by the protagonist.  In 
this case these elements (called “cognitions” within the context of the theory) 
are the ones pertinent to the non-fit between Sally’s two stances regarding 
labor.  For example, Sally has a certain built-in social support for her 
American-styled view, particularly in the form of her father's presence. She 
may also imagine working in her father's firm after college, all of this being 
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congruent (consonant) with the value internalized earlier.  As for the recently-
internalized French values, she has the social support of her French family, 
co-workers, and also knows that she enjoys her workplace in France.  Thus, 
in adding up all of the cognitive elements that are potentially dissonant or 
consonant with one another, we arrive at a formula that is determined by the 
number of them, but also weighted by their importance (Brehm & Cohen, 
1962; Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999; Wicklund & Brehm, 
1976). 
Sensing these discrepancies, and presumably motivated to do 
something about the dissonance brought forth through the simultaneous 
existence of all of the discrepant elements, Sally will set on a course that 
involves adding more consonance to one side of the cognitive clash, while 
subtracting elements from the other side.  That is, she will effect dissonance 
reduction in a manner oriented around one of the two sides that are in non-fit.  
From that point on, all cognitions that support the "favorable” side are labeled 
by the theory as consonant, while those supporting the "unfavorable” side are 
labeled as dissonant. 
If the precedent established by Festinger's forced compliance paradigm 
is taken as a guide line, empirical research has Sally bolstering the side 
associated with the more recent commitment. The French labor values and all 
cognitions in accord with that direction will be emphasized, will gain in 
importance, and she will expose herself selectively to information favoring the 
French value.  The cognitions that now qualify as "dissonant", meaning the 
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values stemming from the American family, will be eliminated and/or 
trivialized.  
But is it plausible to assume that the recently acquired values of her 
French experience are more ingrained, more resistant to change, than those 
from her previous 20 years of living at home?  Is it plausible to assume she 
can so easily rid herself of the values instilled by her parents and similar 
others?  [This, then, is the first problem: delete??] The forced compliance 
paradigm would have us believe that the cognitions derived from one's history 
are easier to change than the cognitions typically created within the last 20 
minutes in the laboratory. 
Resistance to Change 
The concept of resistance to change is what sets the theory apart from 
other notions about cognitive conflict or imbalance, and has been regarded as 
the aspect of the theory that gives it a unique predictive power.  This is the 
construct that provides the answer to "What direction?" in regard to reducing 
dissonance, thus points the researcher or practitioner toward the end state of 
affairs that the person experiencing dissonance will seek. 
Little systematic work has been done to clarify or operationalize the 
notion of resistance.  In the original statements by Festinger (1954/1999; 
1957), there is the sense that resistance is bound up with notions of human 
motivation, behavior, and external physical reality.  For example, in the 
earliest statement (1954/1999), the resistance of a given cognitive element 
was regarded as a function of the resistance to change of the behavior(s) 
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underlying that cognition.  In turn, the resistance to change of the behaviors 
depended on the intensity of motivations addressed by those behaviors (pp. 
362-363, Festinger, in Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). 
Resistance to change was dealt with similarly in the first formal writing 
on the theory (1957), in the sense that resistance of cognitions stems from 
the relative fixedness of behaviors pertinent to the cognitions.  In addition, 
Festinger named the forces of external reality (e.g., it is difficult to deny the 
fact of a rain storm) as well as the inclusion of a cognition in a tight network 
of other cognitions (p. 27).  The sum of these three sources of resistance to 
change -- the behavioral, the constraints of a fixed environment, and the 
cognitive imbedment of the relevant cognitions --constituted the conceptual 
basis for dissonance researchers' use of the resistance concept. 
But as the theory came to be anchored in empirical research, the formal 
use of resistance to change as a device for deriving precise predictions was 
by and large dropped.  Notable in this respect is the forced compliance 
paradigm, whose flagship in the literature has been the Festinger and 
Carlsmith (1959) experiment.  The theoretical parts of the article as well as 
the statements of prediction make no mention of resistance to change.  
Perhaps the investigators thought it obvious that the participants' cognition 
about own behavior would be more resistant to change than the cognition 
about the enjoyableness of the tasks, for which there was a very brief history.  
In discussing the forced compliance issues conceptually, Festinger (1957) 
also leaves out the resistance-to-change concept entirely, and simply allows 
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that dissonance reduction in the form of opinion change will be toward 
favoring the most recently enacted, opinion-relevant behavior. 
The commitment to recent action was given an expanded role in the 
1962 version of cognitive dissonance theory by Brehm and Cohen, and in turn 
set the stage for further experimental research on the theory.  From that point 
on there was virtually no questioning of the idea that dissonance reduction 
would generally be oriented around the recent commitment. Brehm and 
Cohen also discussed contrary cases at some length (pp. 55-60), under the 
rubric "boomerang effects".  This latter conceptual aspect, having to do with 
whether the previously-existing value/opinion might be more resistant to 
change, has not been followed up systematically in subsequent tests of the 
theory.  Cases of a predicted boomerang effect, following 1962, are rare. 
The issue of "Which cognition is more resistant?" was discussed again 
by Wicklund and Brehm in 1976:  
It may be naive to say that one cognition (recent behavior) is 
firmly rooted in behavior, while the other (prior attitude) is not.  If 
for example the attitude is a political belief, there is every 
likelihood that some sort of belief-consistent action has been 
taken previously. . . This being the case, are we not dealing with 
two opposing cognitions that should both be highly resistant to 
change?   And if so, which cognition is the stronger?  Around 
which cognition will dissonance be reduced? (p. 6). 
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Noting that the empirical work underlying the theory generally manifests 
attitude change in the direction of the recent commitment, we pointed out that 
an extra-theoretical assumption must be made in order to account for the 
apparent uniformity of the attitude change effects.  More concretely, two 
extra-theoretical reasons were offered in an attempt to give some 
interpretation of the accumulated forced-compliance effects:  
1. Taking an overt position at variance with an earlier one is a 
form of conversion.  It may generally be true that a conversion is 
difficult to reconvert.  There are barriers of having to admit to 
hypocrisy, indecisiveness, and uncertainty; and 
2. The recent behavior is bound to be more salient in the 
individual´s consciousness.  If previous behaviors are relatively out of 
mind, they provide less basis for a highly resistant-to-change cognitive 
element (p. 6).   
These two supplementary assumptions were not followed up in a critical 
manner, but if we examine the research to date that is relevant to them, they 
hardly hold water.  Regarding the first assumption, research participants are 
in any case admitting to hypocrisies implicitly: Their final opinion positions 
usually continue to favor the original position -- that is, the side of the issue in 
opposition to the role-playing.  And given that their final opinions tend to be 
nearer the neutral-point than their original opinion, participants are apparently 
less sure of their original stand, but not converted to the role-played stand. 
 17
With respect to the second assumption, there is now a considerable 
body of experiments that convincingly makes subjects' original position highly 
salient (Brock, 1962; Green, 1974; Pallak, Sogin, & Cook, 1974; Ross & 
Schulman, 1973; Zanna, Lepper, & Abelson, 1973).  Attitude change in the 
direction of the recent commitment continues anyway, and uniformly, as long 
as subjects have a semblance of free choice in their various role-playings. 
These consistent findings clearly disagree with what the 1957 
dissonance theory lead one to expect.  Sally's long history of behaving in the 
tradition of her family, and of being surrounded by undeniable environmental 
factors congruent with that value imply that her earlier-established value will 
be more resistant.  By this logic, Sally's dissonance, if she does indeed 
experience the state as described theoretically, should entail bolstering the 
earlier-formed value and abandoning or trivializing the recent one (see Brehm 
& Cohen, p. 59).  
Do the Effects Then Indicate "Closing Down"? 
Dissonance reduction should result in a strong and relatively uniform 
set of cognitions favoring one side and derogating the opposing side.  But as 
we have noted, post-role-playing attitudes appear to be more moderate, not 
more polarized.  Dissonance theory fails not only in predicting which side will 
be strongly endorsed, but also in predicting that the final result should be a 
one-sided attitude.  Is there, then, a possible alternative way to understand 
the attitude results of forced compliance research?  
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Referring back to the notions of internalization, we can say that these 
same kinds of circumstances, i.e., relatively free-willed, non-forced, 
frustrating and cumbersome role-playing and the like, should lead to multiple 
perspectives.  This means that the older set of values and the newer set exist 
side-by-side, whereby either set can be implemented.  The foregoing 
internalization-theory use of such role-playing situations assumes a 
progressive opening-up, a quantitative enlargement and heterogeneity within 
the person's behavioral dispositions. 
The shifts in attraction to role-played positions are clearly a reflection 
of the taking-ownership phenomenon (Habermas, 1996).  Had the Festinger-
tradition studies also measured the subjective feeling of ownership, the sense 
of possessing the value a long time, or the readiness to implement the new 
value in behavior, the picture would have been more complete.  Important for 
the multiple-internalization idea is that the "resting state" of respondents' 
cognitive systems, i.e., the attitude as reflected in the post-measure, does not 
bring us to conclude that anything has been excluded from the broader value 
repertoire.  Generally the previous value carries more positive affect than the 
more recent one, and there is no evidence that subjects' subsequent 
behavioral inclinations are aligned solely with the new direction.  In sum, we 
find no clear evidence for closing down. 
Procedures that Should Minimize Dissonance  
Certain experimental results associated with the dissonance school 
confront people, against their will, with a new or foreign value (Götz-
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Marchand, Götz, & Irle, 1974). By the usual way of doing things, such a 
procedure should not create cognitive dissonance, because the volition 
element is missing entirely. Interestingly, these procedures seem to result in 
a re-affirmation of the earlier position.  Rather than adopting that which is 
new, or recent, subjects can be shown to retreat.  Such an effect is indeed in 
line with the resistance-to-change reasoning.  
But such findings do little to make the case for dissonance theory as it 
is usually stated, i.e., as a theory of volitionally-mediated cognitive 
discrepancies.  Moreover, this kind of finding has no singular qualities that 
would separate it from other bodies of research on ego-protection or 
defensiveness (Shaver, 1975; Snyder, Stephan, & Rosenfield, 1978;Wicklund 
& Gollwitzer,1982).   
For these reasons it is doubtful that such procedures, which essentially 
attack values or competencies, indicate a direction that is desired in trying to 
clarify the character of cognitive dissonance processes.  And this kind of 
dilemma raises the more general question of whether a cognitive closing 
down--an attempted narrowing--is part and parcel of role-playing procedures 
at all.   
In Search of a Process of Closing Down: What Criteria? 
A Need for Coherent Action?   One can underpin a presumed tendency 
toward closing down with the assumption that a straightening out of cognitive 
elements serves the organism’s long-term survival (Festinger, 1954/1999, p. 
356) or the desire for efficient action (Harmon-Jones, 2000).  Taking the 
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argument  to Sally’s case, a shift in favor of French values and a 
minimization/derogation of the USA-values would be adaptive in her future 
France-based activities.  The difficulty in bringing this assumption to the role-
playing case is that participants’ final values continue to be in accord with the 
original values; there is no conversion.  Further, those same people seldom 
proceed to take subsequent actions congruent with their role-played 
positions. 
More articulated indices of attitude change.  Articulated measures, in 
the sense of separate measurements for the chosen and rejected 
alternatives, are common within the literature on free choice (see Brehm & 
Cohen, 1962; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976).  This means that if a person selects 
one of several available occupations, sports activities, or consumer articles, it 
is possible to see whether the effects are limited to heightened evaluations of 
the selection, or to the derogation or refutation of the rejected alternatives. 
Such articulation as applied to Sally’s American and French values 
simply means separate indices for each of the two cultural orientations.  A 
strict dissonance derivation would assume an increment in pro-French 
leanings along with a derogation of American labor values. 
One approach to more differentiated measurement, with a concentration 
on the possibility that openness to both positions on an issue is possible, has 
been initiated by Pantaleo (1999; 2001). For instance, Pantaleo (2001) 
reports a study in which non-smokers were recruited for a characteristic 
forced-compliance cognitive dissonance experiment. Subjects assigned to a 
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control condition were asked to write a short essay on the topic of advertising 
in television, i.e., an essay irrelevant to smoking, while those in the 
experimental condition were asked to compose an essay favoring the pro-
smoking position.  Both groups were given the impression they had high 
choice about compliance in writing the essay. 
After the essay all subjects read brief statements supposedly from two 
individuals -- one in favor of smoking, the other against. The dependent 
measure asked each participant to indicate which one of the following three 
statements he most agreed with: 
1. I am primarily in accord with the argumentation favoring smoking. 
2. I am primarily in accord with the argumentation against smoking. 
3. I find that both of the argumentations are plausible. 
The clear majority of those in the control condition (79%) endorsed the 
statement against smoking, while the endorsement by those who wrote in 
favor of smoking was split (50/50) between the anti-smoking statement and 
the statement finding both arguments plausible.  In short, in Pantaleo’s use of 
more articulated measures, the effects appear contrary to a closing down 
phenomenon. 
 Trying indices other than value change.  Occasionally the cognitive 
dissonance literature has employed indices of affective states (e.g., Elliot & 
Devine, 1994; Shaffer & Hendrick, 1974; Cooper, Zanna   ) as well as 
measures of physiological arousal (e.g., Harmon-Jones, 2000).  The idea is 
that cognitive inconsistency should be reflected in tension and discomfort.  
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But the interpretive problem remains: Tension and arousal are a part of the 
conflict and difficulty associated with internalization and subsequent 
enrichened value repertoires. 
Opening vs. Closing: Summary 
To be sure, there are manifold effects of a person's more-or-less 
voluntarily trying out a new opinion/value position. But the procedure per se, 
no matter whether labeled role-playing, drama therapy, forced-compliance, 
'induced' compliance, guided imitation, or the like, cannot be equated with 
one specified psychological process. As we have shown, there is no firm 
basis for concluding that such procedures as guided imitation or the role-
playing of a new position automatically brings forth a dissonance reduction 
effect that is guided by a resistance-to-change principle. 
To call such procedures "forced compliance dissonance paradigms" 
closes one's interpretive possibilities. This is particularly consequential in the 
present case, because the same kinds of procedures have typically stood for 
the every-day course of events in young persons' acquiring a diverse 
repertoire of value systems. In addition, one must come to grips with the 
observation that adults often embody multiple sets of leanings--behavioral 
dispositions (Sande et al, 1988), values (Baldwin & Holmes, 1987), attitudes 
(Pantaleo, 1999; 2001) -- that seem to contradict one another. 
There are indeed processes of narrowing or closing down that follow 
the theoretical guide set up by the original cognitive dissonance theory, but 
these predicted effects are to be found primarily within the free choice 
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paradigms, i.e., those in which no one exerts pressure to adopt an untried or 
foreign direction. As we have tried to show, the role-playing procedures do 
not result in closing-down effects that are in clear accord with the resistance-
to-change element that is so central to dissonance theory.  To the contrary, 
there is just as much reason to suppose that role-playing or guided imitation 
leads to an expanded repertoire -- to multiple internalizations. 
The unequivocal closing-down appears most readily when a new 
position or point of view is forced on the person. In these cases, as in 
producing defensiveness by attacking or confronting an individual's prior 
convictions, the person's retreating to one narrowed position or belief is 
evident enough. Cognitive dissonance theory's difficulty in such settings is 
that force, or surprise, have historically been regarded as weakening or 
eliminating dissonance, and therefore undermining the closing-down course 
of events. 
The Role of Recent Behavior: Efference 
Behavioral intentions and efference.  Any theory about decisions must 
assume a strong relationship between perceived qualities of choice 
alternatives and decisions.  Obviously, if there is no relationship, the 
organism will perish except when surrounded by favorable outcomes.  
Furthermore, the better the discernment of quality in alternatives, the stronger 
can be a person's efficiency in action and consequent quality of life.  But 
making use of available discernment depends on a close relationship between 
perception and judgment, on the one hand, and decisions to act, on the other.  
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For a person to maximize surviving and thriving, the sole determinant of such 
decisions should be perceptual and judgmental accuracy concerning the 
"true" qualities of alternatives.    
This surely is what Festinger assumed about predecisional processes, 
and it may also be why Festinger's initial analysis of cognitive dissonance 
(Appendix A, pp. 355-379, Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999) was in terms of 
behavior, on the one hand,  and cognition about the environment and self on 
the other, rather than just in terms of cognition of any kind.  The published 
formulation of dissonance theory treats a person´s taking action as just one 
more source of cognition, along with other information about the self and the 
environment.   Although this approach seems elegant conceptually, which 
may be why Festinger chose it, the role of action in determining dissonance 
and dissonance reduction was thereby diminished.  As we have explained 
above, the theory, if interpreted strictly, does not work properly.  Beliefs, 
attitudes, and values long held and practiced do not appear to be the 
cognitions around which dissonance from compliant behavior is reduced.  As 
most dissonance researchers have assumed, and as Beauvois and Joule 
(1996) made explicit, the compliant freely chosen behavior appears to have 
superordinate status among cognitions.  This means that the more elegant 
theoretical formulation (Festinger, 1957), which demoted behavior to 
knowledge similar to all other knowledge, may have been in error.   
Following this line of thought, another way to interpret forced 
compliance effects, as well as those of free choice studies, is that recent 
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behavior is the criterion by which all relevant cognition must be judged.  Prior 
to behavioral commitment, a person’s task is to produce behavior that is 
maximally consonant with what is known about the self and the environment.  
After the commitment, when rationality has done its bit, there is a tendency to 
see the world in accordance with the commitment. While there are constraints 
on cognitive changes regarding the chosen course of action, given that 
effective behavior must still be guided by reality, people's perceptions of 
rejected alternatives can be changed with little danger of affecting their 
welfare.  A person can dismiss all the reasons on hand for not complying, but 
according to this analysis, the person cannot reduce the importance of the 
last relevant, freely chosen behavior. 
Behavioral intention; not behavior per se.  But is it the person's own 
behavior, as observed by the self, that determines what cognitions are 
consonant or dissonant?  Do people consider their recent behavior as "truth" 
and then feel motivated to eliminate or reduce knowledge that is in 
disagreement with that truth?  This sequence of events may well occur, but 
not necessarily in every case.   Rather, the behavioral intention should 
determine which other cognitions are consonant or dissonant. By "intention" 
we do not mean such verbal expressions as "I will try to do X" (e.g., Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1996), but rather, the person's felt impulse to action 
(see Ach, 1910).   Even after having acted, and even if the person has made 
observable mistakes relative to the intention (see, e.g., Aronson, 1968), the 
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determination of consonance or dissonance of consequences must surely be 
in terms of what one intended to do.    
In turn, this assumption is in keeping with Festinger's (e.g., Festinger & 
Canon, 1965) view of the antecedents of the perception of location.   He used 
the term efference  to indicate that the perception of location is influenced by 
the signals that the brain sends to the relevant musculature.  If the brain 
signals a person's arm to reach to the right in order to touch a certain item X, 
then the perception of item X's location in the visual field will tend to 
correspond.   This efferent process is said to have precedence over the 
afferent-based perceptions that are not founded in behavior or readiness to 
behave. 
It is plausible that this fundamental effect of intended behavior on 
cognition/perception, which Festinger and Cannon traced back to Helmholtz 
(1925) and von Holst (1954), was the implicit basis of cognitive dissonance 
theory.  Though this basic insight about human behavior may well have led 
Festinger to formulate dissonance theory, and to his subsequent investigation 
of the influence of efference on perception, it is not captured in dissonance 
theory as formally stated (Festinger, 1957; 1964). 
Research participants' perceptions of "where the commitment lies."  
One implication of the thinking is for a person's perception of the extremity of 
a value-relevant behavior.  An investigator, asking a participant to "strongly" 
represent a certain unpopular position--such as tax increments--often 
assumes that the subjects who proceed to role-play do indeed enact an 
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extreme sequence of actions, or at least, that the participants perceive their 
actions or intentions to be extreme.  However, if subjects' intentions are 
indeed to feign a strong position, to do "as if," to withhold certain possible 
arguments, then they are likely enacting only a commitment that is--in their 
perceptions--moderately at variance from their prior value repertoire.  This 
being the case, we should not be surprised when value/attitude change in the 
paradigm we have referred to is modest, not having the character of 
conversion.   
Summary 
We have outlined two quite different views of the results of role-playing 
or "forced compliance" procedures, neither of which agrees with dissonance 
theory as stated.  The movement of attitudes, values, or other behavioral 
dispositions from a relatively strong position, to one ostensibly  more 
moderate subsequent to induced compliance, may be the only manner in 
which a diverse repertoire can be reflected via simple scaling procedures.  
That is to say: Given that several values have been internalized, mutually at 
variance with one another, the result of trying to measure them with 
traditional scales will be a seemingly moderate position.  Conversely, 
movement toward moderate positions can indicate that freely induced 
behavioral intention is the sole criterion by which cognitions can be judged as 
consonant or dissonant, and that the only relevant cognitions subsequent to 
formation of the intention are those associated with the chosen alternative. 
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As will be apparent, our analyses suggest a number of directions for 
research.  Both methodological and theoretical issues need further 
examination, and we hope that the present article will stimulate both thought 
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